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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term 
Robert E. Riggs* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines the positions taken by individual justices of 
the United States Supreme Court on selected categories of cases decided 
during the 1986 term. It is the first of what is intended to be an annual 
survey of Supreme Court voting behavior. Since 1949 the Harvard Law 
Review has included several statistical tables with an annual analysis of 
the Supreme Court term, but tables dealing with actions of individual 
justices are currently limited to figures for opinions written, dissenting 
votes, voting alignments with other members of the court, and partici-
pation with the majority in 5-4 decisions. 1 The Journal of Public Law 
believes that additional voting data supplied on an annual basis would 
be of interest to students of the Supreme Court, and this article is a 
first step toward meeting that need. 
For this initial survey, the analysis has been limited to eight cate-
gories of issues that occur each term with some frequency and which 
may provide indicators of the justices' views on important issues of con-
stitutional interpretation and individual rights. The eight categories are 
as follows: 
1) Civil cases in which a state, or one of its political subdivi-
sions, is opposed by a private party. 
2) Civil cases in which the federal government, or one of its 
agencies, is opposed by a private party. 
3) State criminal cases. 
4) Federal criminal cases. 
5) Cases raising a first amendment issue of speech or 
association. 
6) Cases raising an equal protection issue. 
7) Cases raising a statutory civil rights claim. 
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. B.A., 1952, M.A., 1953, University of Ari-
zona; Ph.D., 1955, University of Illinois; LL.B., 1963, University of Arizona. The author wishes 
to acknowledge the research assistance of Michael R. Moss, Jeffrey Peatross, Douglas Short, and 
Paul W. VanDerwerken. 
I. See The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 304-07 (1986). The Harvard 
survey in its present form was instituted in 1949. See The Supreme Court, 1948 Term, 63 HARV. 
L. REV. 121 (1949). 
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8) Cases raising an issue of federal court jurisdiction, stand-
ing, justiciability, or similar matters. 
Voting data for each of the eight categories are presented in Ta-
bles 1-8. 
Each of the categories in some way taps attitudes of the jus-
tices toward two super-issues having relevance for most Supreme 
Court decision making-individual rights and judicial restraint. A 
claim of individual rights, whether based on statute or a constitu-
tional guarantee, usually finds the claimant opposed by the state or 
by a relatively powerful social group or organization. Judicial re-
straint is normally identified with deference to legislatures as the 
policy-making branch of government, respect for precedent, avoid-
ance of constitutional questions when narrower grounds for deci-
sion are available, avoidance of unnecessary decisions, and giving 
great weight to the framers' intent (when ascertainable) m con-
struing constitutional text. 
Judicial restraint and concern for individual rights are not 
opposite poles of a single attitudinal dimension. Respect for prece-
dent, avoidance of constitutional questions and unnecessary deci-
sions, and even searching for the framers' intent could cut either 
way with respect to individual rights. Nevertheless, there is a good 
deal of tension between the two. Deference to legislatures fre-
quently means rejection of an individual's claim, especially one 
predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action. Emphasis 
upon framers' intent can mean reluctance to read new individual 
rights into the Constitution. Avoiding decisions by federal courts 
leaves the decision to state courts, with their possible bias in favor 
of actions by state governments. In the voting tabulations that fol-
low, most of the data that support an inference of judicial re-
straint, or lack of it, will also be consistent, respectively, with a 
narrow or a broad view of individual rights. 
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II. THE VoTING RECORD 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Votes Favoring Votes Favoring Not 
Justice Government Private Party Voting 
Rehnquist 28 (71.8%) 11 (28.2%) 0 
O'Connor 25 (64.1 o/o) 14 (35.9%) 0 
Scalia 25 (64.1%) 14 (35.9%) 0 
Powell 19 (51.4%) 18 ( 48. 7%) 2 
Stevens 18 ( 46.2%) 21 (53.9%) 0 
White 17 ( 43.6%) 22 (56.4%) 0 
Blackmun 14 (36.8%) 24 (63.2o/o) 1 
Brennan 13 (33.3%) 26 (66.7%) 0 
Marshall 12 (30.8%) 27 ( 69.2%) 0 
Majority 21 (53.9%) 18 ( 46.2%) 
TABLE 2 
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Votes Favoring Votes Favoring Not 
Justice Government Private Party Voting 
Rehnquist 29 (90.6%) 3 (9 .4%) 0 
White 27 (87.1 o/o) 4 (12. 9%) 1 
Scalia 24 (82.8%) 5 (17 .2%) 3 
O'Connor 24 (75.0%) 8 (25.0%) 0 
Powell 23 (71. 9o/o) 9 (28.1 o/o) 0 
Blackmun 17 (53.1%) 15 ( 46. 9%) 0 
Stevens 16 (50.0%) 16 (50.0%) 0 
Marshall 15 ( 46.9%) 17 (53.1 o/o) 0 
Brennan 14 ( 43.8%) 18 (56.3%) 0 
Majority 22 (68.8%) 10 (31.3%) 
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TABLE 3 
STATE CRIMINAL CASES 
Votes Favoring Votes Favoring Not 
Justice Government Defendant Voting 
Rehnquist 29 (87.9%) 4 (12.1%) 0 
White 27 (81.8%) 6 (18.2%) 0 
O'Connor 25 (75.8%) 8 (24.2%) 0 
Scalia 25 (75.8%) 8 (24.2%) 0 
Powell 21 (63.6%) 12 (36.4%) 0 
Blackmun 10 (30.3%) 23 (69.7%) 0 
Stevens 7 (21.2%) 26 (78.8%) 0 
Brennan (3.0%) 32 (97.0%) 0 
Marshall 1 (3.0%) 32 (97.0%) 0 
Majority 20 (60.6%) 13 (39.4%) 
TABLE 4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
Votes Favoring Votes Favoring Not 
Justice Government Defendant Voting 
O'Connor 9 (90.0%) 1 (10.0%) 0 
White 9 (90.0%) 1 (10.0%) 0 
Rehnquist 9 (80.0%) 2 (20.0%) 0 
Scalia 7 (70.0%) 3 (30.0%) 0 
Powell 6 (60.0%) 4 (40.0%) 0 
Stevens 4 (40.0%) 6 (60.0%) 0 
Blackmun 3 (30.0%) 7 (70.0%) 0 
Brennan 0 (0.0%) 10 (100.0%) 0 
Marshall 0 (0.0%) 10 (100.0%) 0 
Majority 6 (60.0%) 4 (40.0%) 
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TABLE 5 
CASES INVOKING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
OF EXPRESSION AND ASSOCIATION 
Votes Favoring Votes Opposing Not 
Justice First Amendment First Amendment Voting 
Claims Claims 
Brennan 11 (91. 7%) (8.3%) 0 
Marshall 11 (91.7%) 1 (8.3%) 0 
Blackmun 8 (72.7%) 3 (27.3%) 1 
Powell 7 (58.3%) 5 ( 41. 7%) 0 
Stevens 6 (50.0%) 6 (50.0%) 0 
O'Connor 5 ( 45.5%) 6 (54.6%) 1 
White 5 (41.7%) 7 (58.3%) 0 
Scalia 4 (36.4o/o) 7 (63.6%) 1 
Rehnquist 2 (16.7o/o) 10 (83.3%) 0 
Majority 7 (58.3%) 5 ( 41. 7%) 
TABLE 6 
EQUAL PROTECTION CASES 
Votes Favoring Votes Opposing Not 
Justice Equal Protection Equal Protection Voting 
Claim Claim 
Brennan 5 (71.4%) 2 (28.6%) 0 
Marshall 5 (71.4%) 2 (28.6%) 0 
Blackmun 4 (57.1%) 3 (42.9%) 0 
O'Connor 3 ( 42. 9%) 4 (57.1 %) 0 
Stevens 2 (33.3%) 4 ( 66. 7%) 1 
White 2 (28.6%) 5 (71.4%) 0 
Powell 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%) 0 
Rehnquist 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%) 0 
Scalia (14.3%) 6 (85.7%) 0 
Majority 1 (14.3%) 6 (85.7%) 
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TABLE 7 
CASES INVOLVING STATUTORY 
CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Votes 
Votes Favoring Opposing Not 
Justice Civil Rights Civil Rights Voting 
Claim Claim 
Blackmun 11 (84.6o/o) 2 (15.4o/o) 0 
Brennan 11 (84.6o/o) 2 (15.4o/o) 0 
Marshall 11 (84.6o/o) 2 (15.4o/o) 0 
Stevens 8 (61.5o/o) 5 (38.5o/o) 0 
White 8 (61.5o/o) 5 (38.5o/o) 0 
Rehnquist 5 (38.5o/o) 8 (61.5o/o) 0 
Scalia 5 (38.5o/o) 8 (61.5o/o) 0 
O'Connor 4 (30.8o/o) 9 ( 69 .2o/o) 0 
Powell 4 (30.8o/o) 9 (69.2o/o) 0 
Majority 7 (53.9o/o) 6 ( 46.2o/o) 
TABLE 8 
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO THE 
EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Votes 
Votes Favoring Opposing Not 
.I ustice Exercise Exercise Voting 
Stevens 20 (71.4o/o) 8 (28.6o/o) 0 
White 20 (71.4o/o) 8 (28.6o/o) 0 
Powell 19 ( 67. 9o/o) 9 (32.1 o/o) 0 
Rehnquist 19 ( 67. 9o/o) 9 (32.1o/o) 0 
Blackmun 18 (64.3o/o) 10 (35.7o/o) 0 
O'Connor 18 (64.3o/o) 10 (35.7o/o) 0 
Scalia 16 (61.5o/o) 10 (38.5o/o) 2 
Brennan 17 ( 60.7o/o) 11 (39.3o/o) 0 
Marshall 16 (57.1 o/o) 12 ( 42. 9o/o) 0 
Majority 17 { 60. 7o/o~ 11 (39.3o/o) 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A list of cases included in each of the eight categories, and the 
criteria governing their selection, are presented in an appendix to this 
article. Each case was read and coded by at least three readers, and 
differences in classification were discussed in order to arrive at consen-
sus on the appropriate classification. The result undoubtedly falls 
somewhat short of perfect validity and reliability, but we believe that 
other readers using the same coding criteria would arrive at substan-
tially the same results. Still, not all difficult problems of judgment are 
eliminated by the criteria. In a few cases, justices are listed as voting 
the same way even though some joined a majority opinion and others 
dissented. In Pope v. Illinois,2 for example, all members of the Court 
agreed that the trial court had committed error in its jury instruction. 
The majority remanded for a determination whether the error was 
harmless; dissenters believed the error was not harmless and justified 
outright reversal. The remand was considered as a vote against the 
State (and in favor of the defendant) even though the dissenters would 
have reached a decision much more favorable to the defendant. Since 
the voting classification is dichotomous, with no allowance for positions 
in between, all justices were treated as voting against the State. The 
necessity of reading and interpreting several opinions in a single case, 
including some that dissent or concur in part, obviously leaves room for 
legitimate difference of opinion how a particular justice's "vote" should 
be coded. 
With that caveat, a brief discussion of the statistical tables may be 
helpful. The first four tables deal with mutually exclusive categories: 
no case coded in one of the categories is included in any of the other 
three. By definition, a case would not be categorized as both civil and 
criminal, nor would a case on review by the Supreme Court involve a 
simultaneous federal and state prosecution. A civil suit involving a pri-
vate party on one side and both a state and a federal agency on the 
other is not inconceivable, but no case of that nature was decided by 
full opinion during the 1986 term. 3 In contrast, the last four tables do 
not involve mutually exclusive categories. The categories are based on 
issues rather than parties, which means that a case raising more than 
one relevant issue will be included in more than one category. For ex-
2. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
3. In a class action brought by welfare recipients against the North Carolina Department of 
Human Resources, Flaherty v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987), the State impleaded the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The lawsuit against the United States 
was docketed as a separate action, Bowen v. Gilliard, I 07 S. Ct. 3008 (1987), although both cases 
were decided in a single opinion. 
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ample, an action by a private party against a state might conceivably 
raise issues pertaining to the first amendment, equal protection, statu-
tory civil rights, and jurisdiction. If so, it would be included in each of 
the last four tables, as well as in Table 1 (state/private civil controver-
sies). The voting on each of the issues would not necessarily be the 
same, however. The Court might be unanimous on the jurisdictional 
issue but divided, perhaps different ways, on the other issues. 
Table 1 lists the number of times (with percentages) each justice 
voted for and against the state government in a civil dispute with a 
private litigant. Table 2 gives the same kind of data for civil disputes 
between the federal government and private parties. While the variety 
of cases included in these tables defies any neat summary, a consistent 
record of voting for the government position might be presumed to indi-
cate a posture of judicial restraint (leaving decisions of the political 
branches in place unless a clear reason for deciding otherwise) and a 
narrow view of the scope of individual rights. Inspection of the judicial 
rankings on this scale tends to confirm that presumption, based on 
what is generally known or believed about individual members of the 
Court, with Chief Justice Rehnquist the most supportive of government 
and Justice Marshall and Brennan the least. 
Such a conclusion obviously cannot be drawn from the voting on 
every individual case, however. In johnson v. Transportation Agency,4 
for example, a vote for the state was a vote for a policy of affirmative 
action giving preference to women in state employment. The underly-
ing correlate of the vote might variously be characterized as a strong 
commitment to eliminating gender discrimination, a narrow view of the 
rights of men, or judicial restraint in upholding state policy. Likewise, 
in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra,5 a 
vote for the state (Guerra, Director of California's Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing) was a vote to uphold a California statute 
designed to protect the jobs of women requiring pregnancy leave. Sig-
nificantly, in these cases the justices at the extremes of the table de-
parted from their normal positions-the Chief Justice voting for the 
private party and Justices Brennan and Marshall voting for the state. 
Keystone Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,6 upholding a Pennsylvania 
law prohibiting coal mining that causes subsidence of pre-existing 
buildings, illustrates another exception to the pattern. Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan voted for the state while the Chief Justice voted for 
the coal mining companies. These departures from the general pattern 
4. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
5. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). 
6. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). 
15] SUPREME COURT VOTING BEHAVIOR 23 
reflected in the table support the widely-held belief that Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall are predisposed to take the side of the underdog 
when rights are in conflict, while the Chief Justice is more inclined to 
safeguard established relationships, including vested property rights. 
Table 2 (federal cases), like Table 1 (state cases), shows Rehn-
quist, Brennan and Marshall at the extremes. Of the fourteen cases in 
which Justice Brennan voted for the federal government, ten were de-
cided without an opposing vote, indicating, apparently, a case for the 
government too strong to controvert. Of his other four pro-federal gov-
ernment votes, two upheld the tax liability of corporate taxpayers 
(clearly not underdogs),7 and two had the effect of favoring worker 
rights as against employer.8 Chief Justice Rehnquist's three votes 
against the federal government are found in two unanimous decisions 
and a labor-management dispute in which a vote against government 
was a vote in favor of the employer. 9 With respect to other members of 
the Court, Justices Scalia and O'Connor are near the pro-government 
end of both tables, while Justices Stevens and Blackmun are closer to 
the opposite end. All members of the court showed a greater preference 
for federal than for state government causes, a fact reflected in majority 
votes for the federal government in 71.9o/o of all cases as compared with 
54.1% for state government cases. Justice White showed a marked pref-
erence for federal as compared with state government parties, while 
Justices Powell and Stevens supported both state and federal parties in 
slightly less than half of the relevant cases. 
The two criminal case tables (3 and 4) appear to reflect the same 
attitudes toward judicial restraint and individual rights as do the tables 
for civil cases, except that voting by justices at the extremes of the scales 
is even more one-sided. Brennan and Marshall voted in favor of the 
prosecution only once in 34 state cases and not at all in ten federal 
prosecutions. Justice Brennan's single pro-prosecution vote was a con-
currence in the judgment only and was accompanied by an opinion dis-
sociating himself from portions of the majority opinion.10 Justice Mar-
shall's odd vote was cast in an extradition case. 11 
The heightened polarization in criminal cases is also evident at the 
pro-government end of the rankings. Justice O'Connor voted only once 
against the prosecution in a federal case, and that came by way of a 
7. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987); Commissioner v. Fink, 
107 S Ct. 2729 (1987). 
8. Citirorp Indus. Credit Inc. v. Brock, I 07 S. Ct. 2694 (1987); Fall River Dyeing & Finish-
ing Corp. v. NLRB, I 07 S. Ct. 2225 (1987). 
9. Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 107 S. Ct. 2225 (1987). 
I 0. Connecticut v. Barrett, I 07 S. Ct. 828 (1987). 
11. California v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 2433 (1987). 
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concurrence suggesting that the lower court error may have been harm-
less.12 Justice White wrote the majority opinion in his one disagree-
ment with the federal prosecutors, where he concluded that the federal 
mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, did not reach the defendant's 
conduct. 13 The Chief Justice supported the defendant in the same two 
cases, but no others. The four cases in which Justice Rehnquist favored 
the defendant in a state prosecution were all decided by unanimous 
votes. 
Tables 5, 6, and 7, dealing with claims of constitutional and statu-
tory rights, show the same broad voting patterns as the tabulations 
based on governmental versus private parties. Brennan and Marshall 
are at one extreme, with Rehnquist usually at the other. In Table 5 
(First Amendment) the two liberal justices voted for the claimant in 
eleven of twelve cases. The single exception was Board of Directors of 
Rotary International v. Rotar_v Club of Duarte, 14 in which a vote 
against the first amendment associational rights of Rotary International 
was a vote against its policy of excluding women from membership. 
The Chief Justice twice voted with all other members of the Court in 
finding a constitutional violation/11 although in one of them, Pope v. 
Illinois/6 he joined the court in remanding the cause, over vigorous 
dissent, for determination whether the error was harmless. 
The rankings in Table 6 (equal protection) are quite similar to 
Table 5, except that Justice Powell, who ranked above middle in sup-
port of first amendment claims, joins Rehnquist and Scalia as least sup-
portive of equal protection claims. Rehnquist and Scalia found a viola-
tion of equal protection only once, the claimants being white state 
police officers who objected to Alabama's affirmative action program 
giving promotion preference to blacks. 17 Not surprisingly, that same 
case raised the only equal protection claim to which Brennan and Mar-
shall objected. Justice Powell cast his lone vote for the claimant in a 
decision that struck down an Arkansas tax bearing unequally on differ-
ent types of publications. The principal issue in the case/8 however, 
was not equal protection but first amendment, an area where Justice 
Powell, as shown in Table 5, was much more sympathetic to the 
claimant. 
12. Young v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2124 (1987). 
13. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). 
14. 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987). 
15. Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987); Board of Airport v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. 
Ct. 2568 (1987). 
16. 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
17. United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). 
18. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987). 
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Table 7, dealing with civil rights based on federal statutory rather 
than constitutional grounds, shows somewhat more support for the 
claimed right among justices at the bottom of the scale, but otherwise 
the patterns are similar to Table 5 and 6. Justice Powell again appears 
among the least sympathetic to the claimant, as he did in the equal 
protection cases. Two of his pro-civil rights votes came in unanimous 
decisions that Arabs and Jews, respectively, could state a claim under 
civil rights statutes barring racial discrimination. 19 Another "pro-civil 
rights" vote by conservative members of the court was recorded in 
johnson v. Transportation Agenct0 where Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
White supported a male governmental employee in his Title VII claim 
of sex discrimination. The johnson case, predictably, accounted for one 
of the two votes cast by Justices Brennan and Marshall against statu-
tory claims. Their other negative vote occurred in Corporation of the 
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos,21 which unanimously rejected an employee's claim of religious 
discrimination under Title VII. The employee had been dismissed from 
his job in a church-owned gymnasium for religious reasons, but the 
Court upheld as constitutional a statutory exemption expressly permit-
ting religious organizations to use religious criteria in hiring. 
Table 8 (Jurisdiction) is the only table not conforming in broad 
outline to our initial assumptions about judicial restraint and individual 
rights. The marked variations in the voting of conservative and liberal 
members of the Court, which are apparent in each of the preceding 
tables, do not show up here. The most activist on the jurisdiction scale, 
Justices Stevens and White, favored the exercise of federal court juris-
diction in 20 of 28 cases. The least activist by this criterion, Justice 
Marshall, favored federal court jurisdiction 16 of 28 times-not a very 
significant variation. Moreover, Justice Marshall's position on the scale 
is the reverse of what might have been expected if a vote against federal 
court jurisdiction indicates judicial restraint. He is among the most ac-
tivist on all of the other scales; here he is at the bottom. Justice Rehn-
quist is also out of position: usually at the judicial restraint pole, he is 
nearer the activist end of the jurisdiction scale. 
A closer examination of the cases affords at least a plausible expla-
nation. Eighteen of the twenty-eight cases in which we found an issue 
of jurisdiction (broadly construed to include questions of standing, 
mootness, etc.), were resolved without any apparent dissent. In those 
19. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congrega-
tion v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 (1987). 
20. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
21. 107 S Ct. 2862 (1987). 
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instances the challenge was raised by one of the parties, but it was not 
substantial enough to persuade a single member of the Court. Of the 
remaining ten cases, two were resolved by the predicted voting pat-
tern-Brennan and Marshall voting in favor of jurisdiction, Rehnquist, 
Scalia and O'Connor voting against. A third case, Pennzoil Company 
v. Texaco, Inc. ,22 was a slightly looser fit: Justices Brennan and Ste-
vens favored federal court jurisdiction, while the other seven agreed that 
the district court should have abstained from interfering with the state 
court proceeding. 
The other seven cases are still farther removed from the expected 
pattern. Four of the seven were criminal appeals, in which a vote 
against jurisdiction had the effect of favoring the defendant. 23 In all 
four, the voting was precisely the opposite of the expected: Brennan 
and Marshall opposed federal court jurisdiction while Rehnquist, 
Scalia and O'Connor were in favor. Here one may speculate that deci-
sions on the jurisdictional issue were affected by the underlying predis-
positions of the justices, so strongly attested in Tables 3 and 4, to favor, 
respectively, the criminal defendant, or the prosecution. In a fifth case, 
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,24 all members of the court 
except Justice Stevens voted against jurisdiction. This is consistent with 
the predicted position of restraint by conservative justices but not with 
the greater activism of their more liberal colleagues. In this case, how-
ever, a vote against federal court jurisdiction had the effect of returning 
the dispute to Indian tribal courts where, presumably, the Indian plain-
tiff might fare better against the insurance company defendant. In such 
circumstances, the "underdog" issue may have spelled the difference for 
Justices Marshall and Brennan. In the sixth case, Burke v. Barnes,25 
several members of the House of Representatives challenged President 
Reagan's pocket veto of a bill (which by its own terms expired in 1984) 
conditioning aid to El Salvador upon the President's certification of 
continued progress in protecting human rights. Six members of the 
Court concluded that the cause was moot; Justices Stevens and White 
disagreed, and Justice Scalia did not participate. The vote of Justices 
Brennan and Marshall to hold the question moot cannot be explained 
by any of the theories previously suggested. 
The preceding discussion has highlighted some of the relationships 
apparent in the patterns of voting by Supreme Court justices during the 
22. 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). 
23. Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987); California v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852 
(1987); United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987); and Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 
1990 (1987). 
24. 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). 
25. 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987). 
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1986 term and has used the information to assess their attitudes toward 
individual rights and judicial restraint. It has not exhausted all credible 
interpretations of the data. Readers may, and hopefully will, discover 
other significant relationships and interpretations that the data will sus-
tain. As new data become available each year, the search for trends will 
become an important part of the analysis. For continuity and compari-
son, the Journal of Public Law intends to use essentially the same cate-
gories from year to year. This does not, however, preclude the addition 
of other categories in the future. The author and staff of the Journal 
hope this annual feature will be a useful service to those interested in 
the work of the United States Supreme Court, and we invite sugges-
tions for the augmentation and improvement of subsequent surveys of 
Supreme Court voting. 
IV. APPENDIX 
A. Explanation of Criteria Governing Selection and Classification 
of Cases 
1. The universe of cases 
Only cases decided during the 1986 Term by full opinion setting 
forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Cases handled 
by summary disposition or denial of certiorari, though accompanied by 
written dissents in some instances, are excluded as not being decided by 
written opinion. Cases decided by a 4-4 tie vote, and hence resulting in 
affirmance without written opinion, are also excluded. Both signed 
opinions and per curiam opinions are included, however, if they set 
forth reasons in a more than perfunctory way. All such cases were 
read, but cases not fitting any of the eight categories are of course not 
included in the data base for any of the tables. 
2. Cases classified as civil or criminal 
Classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly ac-
cepted definitions which require no restatement here, although two ex-
tradition cases posed a difficult problem of interpretation. One, Califor-
nia v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 2433 (1987), was 
treated as a criminal case because the real parties in interest were re-
sisting the issuance of an extradition warrant by California to compel 
them to face charges in Louisiana. The second extradition case, Puerto 
Rico v. Branstad, 107 S. Ct. 2802 (1987), was classified as a civil suit 
because Puerto Rico was seeking writ of mandamus to compel the gov-
ernor of Iowa to extradite a fugitive. 
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3. Classification by nature of the parties 
Cases are included in Tables 1-4 only if governmental and private 
entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true of the crim-
inal cases. Civil cases are excluded if they do not satisfy this criterion. 
The governmental entity might be the government itself, one of its 
agencies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one of its 
political subdivisions. In instances of multiple parties, a civil case is 
excluded if governmental entities appear on both sides of the 
controversy. 
4. Classification by nature of the issue 
A case is included in each category, Tables 5-8, for which the rele-
vant issue is raised and addressed in the written opinion(s). A case is 
not included for any issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, 
is not addressed in the opinions. Identification of first amendment and 
equal protection issues posed no special problem; in each instance the 
nature of the claim was expressly identified in the opinions. Cases in-
cluded in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are limited to those 
invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; 
the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the civil rights statutes appearing in 
Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 through 1988; and other federal statutes ex-
pressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national ori-
gin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions brought under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based on 
federal statute or common law; § 1983 actions are excluded if the sub-
stantive right asserted is based on the United States Constitution. The 
purpose of the 1983 exclusion is to preserve the distinction between 
constitutional and non-constitutional claims. For Table 8, jurisdictional 
questions are defined to include not only jurisdiction per se but also 
standing, mootness, ripeness, abstention, equitable discretion, and jus-
ticiability generally. 
B. Cases Included in Statistical Tables 
1. Table 1: Civil Cases: State I Local Government versus Private 
Party 
Kelly v. Robinson, 107 S. Ct. 353 (1986). 
North Carolina Dept. of Transp. v. Crest Street Community Council, 
Inc. 107 S. Ct. 336 (1986). 
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 107 S. Ct. 367 (1986). 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 107 S. Ct. 499 (1986). 
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 107 S. Ct. 533 (1986). 
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Tashjian v. Republican Party, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). 
California Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 
(1987). 
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 107 S. Ct. 720 (1987). 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 
107 S. Ct. 766 (1987). 
I.C.C. v. Texas, 107 S. Ct. 787 (1987). 
Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n of Missouri, 107 S. 
Ct. 821 (1987). 
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization, 107 S. Ct. 1038 
(1987). 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987). 
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107 S. Ct. 1083 
( 1987). 
City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987). 
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). 
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987). 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedicts, 107 S. Ct. 1232 
(1987). 
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 
(1987). 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 
1442 ( 1987). 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987). 
Indiana v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). 
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987). 
Lukhard v. Reed, 107 S. Ct. 1807 (1987). 
Burlington Northern Ry. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 
1855 ( 1987). 
Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 107 S. Ct. 2211 (1987). 
Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). 
Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 2312 
(1987). 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). 
City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502 (1987). 
Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2568 
(1987). 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). 
Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 107 
S. Ct. 2810 (1987). 
National Can Corp. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 107 S. Ct. 
2810 (1987). 
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American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Scheiner, 107 S. Ct. 2829 
(1987). 
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 
2941 (1987). 
Flaherty v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987). 
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 107 
S. Ct. 3078 (1987). 
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987). 
2. Table 2: Civil Cases: Federal Government versus Private Party 
O'Connor v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 34 7 ( 1986). 
Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 
S. Ct. 616 (1986). 
Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987). 
Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 782 (1987). 
C.I.R. v. Groetzinger, 107 S. Ct. 980 (1987). 
United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). 
F.C.C. v. Florida Power Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1107 (1987). 
I.N.S. v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987). 
Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, 107 S. Ct. 1396 (1987). 
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). 
United States v. Cherokee Nation, 107 S. Ct. 1487 (1987). 
United States v. John Doe, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1656 (1987). 
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1732 (1987). 
Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1740 (1987). 
Tull v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987). 
Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987). 
N.L.R.B. v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, Local 340, 107 S. 
Ct. 2002 (1987). 
United States v. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 2063 (1987). 
Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 207 6 ( 1987). 
Fall River Dyeing & Fishing Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 107 S. Ct. 2225 
(1987). 
United States v. Hohri, 107 S. Ct. 2246 (1987). 
Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). 
I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 107 S. Ct. 2360 
(1987). 
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987). 
Frazier v. Heebe, 107 S. Ct. 2607 (1987). 
Hewitt v. Helms, 107 S. Ct. 2672 (1987). 
Citicorp Indus. Credit Inc. v. Brock, 107 S. Ct. 2694 (1987). 
C.I.R. v. Fink, 107 S. Ct. 2729 (1987). 
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United States v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987). 
Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987). 
United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987). 
3. Table 3: State Criminal Cases 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). 
Colorado v. Bertine, 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987). 
Connecticut v. Barrett, 107 S. Ct. 828 (1987). 
California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987). 
Colorado v. Spring, 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987). 
Martin v. Ohio, 107 S. Ct. 1098 (1987). 
Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987). 
Illinois v. Krull, 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987). 
Granberry v. Greer, 107 S. Ct. 1671 (1987). 
Tison v. Arizona, 107 S. Ct. 1676 (1987). 
Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987). 
Richardson v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987). 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 17 56 ( 1987). 
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987). 
Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
Arizona v. Mauro, 107 S. Ct. 1931 (1987). 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 1990 ( 1987). 
Gray v. Mississippi, 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987). 
Hilton v. Braunskill, 107 S. Ct. 2113 (1987). 
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 107 S. Ct. 2415 (1987). 
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California v. Superior Court of California, 107 S. Ct. 2433 (1987). 
Miller v. Florida, 107 S. Ct. 2446 (1987). 
Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987). 
New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987). 
Kentucky v. Stincer, 107 S. Ct. 2658 (1987). 
Ricketts v. Adamson, 107 S. Ct. 2680 (1987). 
Rock v. Arkansas, 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987). 
Sumner v. Shuman, 107 S. Ct. 2716 (1987). 
California v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987). 
Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987). 
Greer v. Miller, 107 S. Ct. 3102 (1987). 
Burger v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 3114 (1987). 
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164 ( 1987). 
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4. Table 4: Federal Criminal Cases 
Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986). 
Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987). 
United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987). 
United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). 
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Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 107 S. Ct. 2124 
(1987). 
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. 2148 (1987). 
Tanner v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2739 (1987). 
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987). 
McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). 
Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987). 
5. Table 5: Cases Invoking First Amendment Rights of Expression 
and Association 
Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 107 S. Ct. 533 (1986). 
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 107 S. Ct. 544 (1986). 
Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 
S. Ct. 616 (1986). 
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987). 
Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987). 
Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918 (1987). 
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 
1940 (1987). 
Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987). 
Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, 107 S. Ct. 2568 (1987). 
Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Commit-
tee, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987). 
City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 3222 (1987). 
6. Table 6: Equal Protection Cases 
Burlington Northern Ry. Co. v. Woods, 107 S. Ct. 967 (1987). 
United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987). 
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987). 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987). 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987). 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Commit-
tee, 107 S. Ct. 2971 (1987). 
Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987). 
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7. Table 7: Cases Involving Statutory Civil Rights Claims 
North Carolina Dept. of Transp. v. Crest Street Community Council, 
107 S. Ct. 336 (1986). 
Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 107 S. Ct. 367 (1986). 
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 
107 S. Ct. 766 (1987). 
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 794 (1987). 
School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987). 
Town of Newton v. Rumery, 107 S. Ct. 1187 (1987). 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). 
O'Connor v. Ortega (2), 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987). 
Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 107 S. Ct. 2019 ( 1987). 
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 107 S. Ct. 2022 (1987). 
Hewitt v. Helms, 107 S. Ct. 2672 (1987). 
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 107 S. Ct. 2862 (1987). 
Rankin v. McPherson, 107 S. Ct. 2891 (1987). 
8. Table 8: Cases Raising a Challenge to the Exercise of jurisdiction 
R.J. Reynolds Tocacco Co. v. Durham County, 107 S. Ct. 499 (1986). 
Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987). 
Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, 107 S. Ct. 750 (1987). 
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987). 
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 107 S. Ct. 971 (1987). 
City of Springfield, Mass. v. Kibbe, 107 S. Ct. 1114 (1987). 
Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 107 S. Ct. 1177 (1987). 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 107 S. Ct. 1410 
( 1987). 
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 
(1987). 
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 107 S. Ct. 1542 (1987). 
Granberry v. Greer (2), 107 S. Ct. 1671 (1987). 
Arkansas Writer' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987). 
Brock v. Roadway Exp., Inc. 107 S. Ct. 1740 (1987). 
Burlington Northern Ry. Co. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way 
Employees, 107 S. Ct. 1841 (1987). 
Burlington Northern Ry. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 
1855 ( 1987). 
Meese v. Keene, 107 S. Ct. 1862 (1987). 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987). 
Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 207 6 ( 1987). 
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United States v. Salerno, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987). 
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO v. Hechler, 107 S. Ct. 
2161 (1987). 
I.C.C. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 107 S. Ct. 2360 
(1987). 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987). 
City of Houston v. Hill, 107 S. Ct. 2502 (1987). 
California. v. Rooney, 107 S. Ct. 2852 (1987). 
Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987). 
Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and Public Transp., 107 S. Ct. 
2941 (1987). 
United States v. Stanley, 107 S. Ct. 3054 (1987). 
